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**Imagery analysis report**

**Analysis of Soviet and  
National Forces Associated with  
The Polish Crisis,**

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Top Secret RUFF [REDACTED]

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25X1**ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AND NATIONAL FORCES ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLISH  
CRISIS.** [REDACTED]

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**INTRODUCTION**

1. [REDACTED] This report presents an imagery-derived analysis of the increased readiness levels of the Soviet combat maneuver divisions in the three western military districts (MD) and airborne divisions between [REDACTED]. In addition, the report indicates the relationship of increased readiness to the Polish/USSR political situation and to the General Staff and KGB/UPS satellite communication activity<sup>1</sup> (Figure 1). Tables 1 through 4 address the current status of the 28 Soviet divisions in the three western military districts (Table 1); seven Soviet airborne divisions (Table 2); 20 key combat maneuver divisions in the Northern, Central, Southern, and [REDACTED] (Table 3); and 29 national divisions—15 Polish, [REDACTED] eight Czechoslovakian, and four Hungarian (Table 4) associated with the Polish crisis. These divisions are depicted on Figure 2. Key logistical and rear services support units are illustrated on Figure 3 and listed in Table 5; Table 6 illustrates logistics activity in the western military districts and the forward armies. Possible staging areas, lines of communications (roads and railroads), and the postulated axes of advance for possible Soviet intervention are shown on Figure 4. All unit designators are derived from collateral documents.<sup>2,3</sup>

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**OVERVIEW**

2. (S/D) By mid-February 1980, increased readiness levels had been seen at nine Soviet combat maneuver divisions (five ready and four cadre) and in three of the Soviet airborne divisions. Of those units, the 26th Guards Motorized Rifle Division (GMRD) at Gusev had elements out of garrison as of [REDACTED] while an increased readiness posture was observed in the 97th GMRD at Slavuta (Figure 5). In addition, a new ready tank division was identified at Grodno.

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3. [REDACTED] The five ready divisions—the 1st GMRD and the 1st Guards Tank Division (GTD) at Kaliningrad, the 128th GMRD at Mukachevo, the 24th Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) at Lvov, and the 40th GTD at Sovetsk—and the three airborne divisions (the 7th at Kaunas, the 98th at Bolgrad, and the 106th at Tula) have remained at an increased readiness level. Two of the four cadre divisions (the 46th GTD at Slonim and the 51st GMRD at Vladimir-Volynskiy) are no longer at an increased state of readiness and are believed to have returned to a premobilization activity level of cadre status. It is believed, however, that these divisions can be quickly brought back to a combat readiness level.

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**CYCLES OF INCREASED ACTIVITY**

4. (S/D) A definite preparedness cycle has taken place in the process of bringing the five ready, four cadre, and three airborne divisions, with their associated command and control, to an increased state of readiness. The increased level of readiness was achieved in two distinct 90-day cycles (Figure 1). The beginning of a probable third 90-day cycle is also illustrated in Figure 1.

5. (S/D) The first cycle of events was seen in early September, when five combat maneuver divisions (the 1st GMRD and the 1st GTD at Kaliningrad, the 4th GTD at Sovetsk of the 11th Guards Army (GA), the 46th GTD at Slonim, and the 128th GMRD at Mukachevo) achieved an increased state of readiness. The imagery signatures that indicated the increased state of readiness in these units consisted of troop processing (Figure 6) and at least three combat maneuver regiments observed on alert and bivouacked out of garrison (with their supporting units) for an extended period of time, regimental rail-loading exercises, and mobilized motor transport battalions augmented with civilian vehicles. In addition, a new ready tank division [REDACTED] moved into Grodno in early September. Since the tank division arrived at Grodno, the unit has only been observed conducting crew training. The airborne divisions have a quick-response mission. More intense predeployment activity was observed here than in the combat maneuver divisions. Activity seen at airborne installations that fits the criteria for determining an increased state of readiness included signal exercises (in garrison), pallet-loading exercises (Figure 7), the preparation of vehicles/equipment to depart garrison (convoy activity), rail-loading exercises, and the uploading of material at depots.

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6. [REDACTED] The General Staff satellite communication activity began in early September. By [REDACTED] the auxiliary command and control center (ACC) was confirmed in the Warsaw area. The General Staff maintained continuous communication with the various headquarters and subordinate units during this 90-day cycle. This communication activity is considered an integral part of the mobilization scenario.<sup>1</sup>

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7. [REDACTED] A second example of the 90-day cycle was seen in late November with the identification of probable mobilization of a hospital unit in Kaliningrad and increased readiness at the 24th MRD at Lvov, a ready division, and two cadre divisions—the 26th GMRD at Gusev (Figure 8) and the 51st GMRD at Valadimir-Volynskiy (Figure 9). Increased readiness was also seen at three airborne divisions.

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Table 1.

## Current Status of Combat Maneuver Divisions in the Three Western MDs

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Military District	Current Unit Status	Current Readiness Level*	Last Imagery Date	Level of Activity	Remarks
<b>Baltic MD</b>					
11th Guards Army					
1st GMRD Kaliningrad	Ready	ICR		Routine	
1st GTD Kaliningrad	Ready	ICR		Routine	
40th GTD Sovetsk	Ready	ICR		Routine	
26th GMRD Gusev	Cadre	ICR		High	Elements out of garrison
Additional Divisions					
3rd GMRD Klaipeda	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
56th GMRD Tallinn	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
107th MRD Vilnius	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
<b>Belorussia MD</b>					
120th GMRD Minsk	Ready	CCR		Routine	Possible preparation for field training observed
28th Army					
46th GTD Slonim	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
Unid TD Grodno (prob 6 GTD)	Ready	CCR		Low	Only crew training observed since [ ]
50th GMRD Brest	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
Unid MRD Brest	Cadre	CCR		Low	
5th GDS Tank Army					
8th GTD Marina Gorka	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
193rd TD Bobruysk	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
29th GTD Slutsk	Cadre	CCR		High	A high level of training activity was observed in the arty reg, tk reg, MR reg, and AA reg areas; the sixty-seven 60-ton semitrailers seen on [ ] at tk reg are gone
7th Tank Army					
3rd GTD Lepel	Cadre	CCR		High	Two tank regiments out of garrison
34th TD Borisov	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
37th GTD Polotsk	Cadre	CCR		High	Two tank companies in convoy
<b>Carpathian MD</b>					
24th MRD Lvov	Ready	ICR		Routine	
8th Tank Army					
23rd TD Ovruch	Ready	CCR		Routine	
30th GTD Novograd Volynskiy	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
50th TD Staro Konstantinov	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
13th Army					
51st GMRD Vladimir Volynskiy	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
97th GMRD Slavuta	Cadre	ICR		High	High level of activity observed in maneuver regiments within garrison; bivouacs in adjacent training area, which includes troop processing
161st MRD Izyaslav	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
38th Army					
70th GMRD Ivano Frankovsk	Cadre	CCR		Routine	
128th GMRD Mukachevo	Ready	ICR		Routine	
17th GMRD Khmel'nitskiy	Cadre	CCR		Routine	

\*CCR—Constant combat readiness is the standard Pact term designating the peacetime posture which is usually maintained by all branches of service. Units are not on alert and are conducting normal peacetime training. Measures are taken by the individual units, however, to assure their ability to mobilize rapidly.

ICR—Increased combat readiness units are placed on alert and take preparatory measures in anticipation of a full mobilization. Depending on the political and military situation, all military forces within a country or one branch of service, one military district, or even one tactical formation may be placed on increased readiness. Those ground forces at or near full strength and having early commitment of deployment times might move out of garrison and into assembly, staging, or concentration areas under the cover of training exercises. Increased readiness is a transitional phase leading to full combat readiness. The duration of this period is directly related to the nature and the duration of the period of tension, rather than to the time necessary to complete the preparatory measures.

FCR—Full combat readiness is the highest armed forces readiness level. Full mobilization is ordered and the forces are prepared to immediately undertake combat missions or deploy under combat alert conditions. This readiness level will only be ordered (excluding training exercises) if there is an immediate threat of hostilities or, as in the case of the Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia, if there is an internal crisis which requires a comparable readiness posture. All forces are intended to achieve full readiness before the outbreak of fighting.

Source for definitions: CIA. SR IR 74-2-s, *Warsaw Pact Mobilization Plans and the Transition to a War Footing*, Mar 74 (SECRET)

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


FIGURE 1. CORRELATION OF SOVIET MILITARY AND GENERAL STAFF COMMUNICATION ACTIVITY WITH POLITICAL EVENTS IN POLAND

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**Table 2.**  
**Current Status of Airborne Divisions***This table in its entirety is classified SECRET//WNINTEL*

Unit	Current Readiness Level*	Last Imagery Date	Remarks
VDV Cmd Auth Moskva/Shchelkovo			Airborne equipment on/off loading two COCK, one CANDID at airfield Possible palletizing observed
7th GAD Kaunas	ICR		
76th GAD Pskov	CCR		
98th GAD Bolgrad	ICR		
			Thirty BMD and approx 30 support vehicles have been removed from sheds
103rd GAD Vitebsk	CCR		
104th GAD Kirovabad	CCR		
			Usual training activity observed; approx 700 parachutes observed at two installations, AI-1 and AI-3
105th GAD Fergana	CCR		
106th GAD Tula	CCR		

\*CCR—Constant combat readiness  
ICR—Increased combat readiness  
ICR—Full combat readiness  
Detailed definitions of these terms may be found in the footnote to Table 1.

**Table 3.**  
**Current Status, Groups of Soviet Forces***This table in its entirety is classified SECRET//WNINTEL*

Unit	Current Readiness Level*	Last Imagery Date	Level of Activity	Remarks
<b>NORTHERN GROUP OF FORCES (NGF)</b>				
NGF Hq Legnica	—	—	High	PARK DRIVE observed
Rombertow Sig Bde & KGB/UPS	—	—	High	Two PARK DRIVE stations observed
90th GTD Borne	Ready	CCR	Routine	143 trucks were seen parade field on
20th TD Swietozow	Ready	CCR	Routine	On is 53-truck convoy was seen
<b>CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES (CGF)</b>				
18th GMRD Miada Boleslav	Ready	CCR	Routine	
15th GTD Milovice	Ready	CCR	High	PARK DRIVE and communication exercise observed
28th Corps				
31st TD Bruntal	Ready	CCR	Routine	
48th MRD Vysoke Myto	Ready	CCR	Routine	
30th GMRD Zvolen	Ready	CCR	High	At least elements of a tk bn and one Czech tk bn (possible joint exercise)
<b>SOUTHERN GROUP OF FORCES (SGF)</b>				
2nd GTD Extergon	Ready	CCR	Routine	
13th GTD Veszprem	Ready	CCR	Routine	
93rd GMRD Kecskemet	Ready	CCR	Routine	
254th MRD Szekesfehervar	Ready	CCR	Routine	

\*CCR—Constant combat readiness  
ICR—Increased combat readiness  
ICR—Full combat readiness  
Detailed definitions of these terms can be found in the footnote to Table 1.

**Table 4.**  
**Current Status of National Forces***This table in its entirety is classified SECRET//WNINTEL*

Unit	Current Unit Status	Last Imagery Date	Level of Activity	Remarks
<b>POLISH NATIONAL FORCES</b>				
6th Airborne Krakow	Ready		Routine	
7th Sea Landing Gdansk	Ready		Routine	
1st MECH Legionowo	Ready		Routine	Out of garrison
2nd MECH Nysa	Ready		Routine	
3rd MECH Lublin	Cadre		Routine	
4th MECH Krosno Odrzanski	Ready		Routine	On 80 trucks in convoy and signal exercise underway.
5th ARMD Gubin	Ready		Routine	
8th MECH Koszalin	Ready		Routine	Out of garrison
9th MECH Rzeszow	Cadre		Routine	
10th ARMD Opole	Ready		Routine	Sig bn in local trng area
11th ARMD Zagan	Ready		Routine	
12th MECH Szczecin	Ready		Routine	Two mech bn, tk bn, eng co, out of garrison
15th MECH Olsztyn	Ready		Routine	
16th ARMD Elblag	Ready		Routine	
20th ARMD Szczecinek	Ready		Routine	
<b>CZECHOSLOVAKIAN NATIONAL FORCES</b>				
1st Army				
1st TD Strasice	Ready		Routine	
2nd MRD Susice	Ready		Routine	
19th MRD Plzen	Ready		Routine	
20th MRD Karlovy Uary	Ready		Routine	
4th Army				
3rd MRD Kromeriz	Ready		Routine	
4th TD Havlickuc Brod	Ready		Routine	
9th TD Tabor	Ready		Routine	
15th MRD Ceske Budejovice	Ready		Routine	
<b>HUNGARIAN NATIONAL FORCES</b>				
7th MRD Kiskunfelegyhaza	Ready		Routine	
8th MRD Zalaegerszeg	Ready		Routine	
9th MRD Kaposvar	Ready		Routine	
11th TD Tata	Ready		Routine	

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


FIGURE 3. KEY LOGISTICS FOR POTENTIAL SOVIET INVASION FORCES



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**Table 5.**  
Critical Logistics/Rear Services Units for Potential  
Soviet Invasion of Poland  
(Keyed to Figure 3)

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Item No	Installation	BE No	Remarks*
<b>Nuclear and Ammunition Facilities</b>			
1	Radvilishkis Tac SSM		Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition
2	Kaliningrad Tac SSM		Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition
3	Kedainiai Tac SSM		Army RTB/PRTB/ORPD
4	Shchuchin Tac SSM		Army RTB/PRTB
5	Dzerzhinsk Tac SSM		Army RTB
6	Osipovich Tac SSM		Army RTB
7	Lepel Tac SSM		Army RTB
8	Bronnaya Gora Tac SSM		Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition
9	Vyskov Tac SSM		Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition
10	Vladimir-Volynskiy Tac SSM		Army RTB
11	Shepetovka Tac SSM		Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition
12	Sambor Tac SSM		Army RTB/PRTB/ORPD
13	Staro Konstantinov Tac SSM		Army RTB
14	Uzhgorod Tac SSM		RTB/PRTB/ORPD
15	Vinnitsa Tac SSM		Army RTB/PRTB
			Front RTB/PRTB/ammunition

**Fuels Facilities**

22	Kaliningrad POL Stor NW		Pipeline bn, POL MT bns
23	Grodno Pet Prod PUG		Front/central depot, reserve pipeline equip
24	Minsk Pet Prod		Front/central depot
25	Berestovitsa Pet Prod		Front/central depot
26	Svisloch Pet Prod		Front/central depot
27	Brest Pet Prod Stor NW		Front/central depot
28	Lukov Army Bks AL-1		Front/central depot
29	Mateyev		POL MT bn, med bn
30	Kovel Army Bks		Pipeline bn
31	Kovel Pet Prod		Front/central depot
32	Yavarov Pet Prod		Front/central depot
33	Novoye Mesto Army Bks AL-1		Pipeline bn, rocket fuel unit
34	Mukachevo Pet Prod		Front/central depot
35	Barkosovo		Front/central depot
36	Furstenwalde Pet Prod		Front/central depot
37	Schliefe Pet Prod		Front/central depot
38	Gyor Pet Prod		Front/central depot
39	Pochinok Pet Prod		Pipeline bn, front/central depot

**Medical Facilities**

39	Kaliningrad		Mobilized hospital, (observed Dec 80)
40	Lukov Army Bks AL-1		OMO
41	Mateyev		OMO
	Furstenwalde Med Depot		OMO

\*RTB: technical rocket base  
PRTB: mobile technical rocket base  
ORPD: independent rocket transport battalion  
MT: motor transport  
OMO: independent medical detachment

**Table 6.**  
Observed Logistics Activity in Forward Armies and MD-subordinate Divisions, September 1980—February 1981  
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		BALTIC MD				BELOUSSIAN MD				CARPATHIAN MD						CGF			GSFG								
		11th GUARDS ARMY				28th ARMY				MD	13th ARMY			38th ARMY			28th CORPS			2nd GUARDS ARMY		28th GUARDS ARMY			1st GUARDS ARMY		
		1st GTD	1st GMRD	40th GTD	26th GMRD	6th GTD	46th TD	50th GMRD	24th MRO	51st GMRD	97th GMRD	161st MRO	128th GMRD	70th GMRD	17th MRO	30th GMRD	31st TD	48th MRO	16th GTD	25th GTD	6th GMRD	35th MRO	14th GMRD	27th GMRD	7th GTD	9th TD	11th GTD
TROOP LEVEL (Regimental/Division) LOGISTICS ACTIVITY	1980																										
	Sep	●	●	●		●	●		●		▨		●		▨		▨										
	Oct	●	●						▨				●		▨		▨		▨	▨		▨		▨	▨	▨	
	Nov								▨	●									▨	▨		▨		▨	▨	▨	
	Dec		May be operational activity		●					●							▨		●	●	●						
	1981									●			▨						▨	▨	●	▨	▨	▨	▨	▨	
Jan									●			▨								Prob harvest mobilization			▨	▨	▨	●	
Feb										●													▨	▨	▨		

TROOP LEVEL  
(Regimental/Division)  
LOGISTICS  
ACTIVITY● Observed motor transport activity,  
ammunition unloading and POL activity

■ Insufficient coverage

OPERATIONAL  
LEVEL  
(Army/Front)  
LOGISTICS  
ACTIVITY

<b>1980</b>																										
<b>Sep</b>		Civilian vehicle mobilization		Civilian vehicle mobilization						Civilian Vehicle Mobilization																
<b>Oct</b>																										
<b>Nov</b>		Rail loading activity																								
<b>Dec</b>		Motor transport activity Medical mobilization (post central logistics activity)								Motor Transport Activity Pass Civilian Vehicle Activity		Motor transport activity							Motor transport activity							
<b>1981</b>																										
<b>Jan</b>																										
<b>Feb</b>																										



FIGURE 4. POSSIBLE STAGING AREAS, LINES OF COMMUNICATION, AND POSTULATED AXES OF ADVANCE FOR SOVIET INTERVENTION IN POLAND

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The KGB/UPS satellite communications net between Moscow and Northern Groups of Forces headquarters at Legnica was operational between [ ] Use of the General Staff satellite net peaked in early December, as indicated by extended hours of operation and the addition of correspondents on the net (Figure 1).

8. (TSR) A probable third 90-day cycle was seen beginning in early February with the identification of the increased readiness posture of the 9th GMRD at Slavuta. On [ ] and continuing through at least [ ] there was extensive in-garrison vehicular activity observed throughout the whole division (Figure 5; troop processing and bivouac activity not shown on graphic). If this is true at Slavuta, it is possible that additional divisions are also at an increased state of readiness. Adverse weather conditions and collection system limitations between [ ] severely hampered the ability to monitor the status of Soviet forces in relation to the destabilizing political conditions in Poland.

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9. [redacted] Throughout the period [redacted] there was no evidence which could be confirmed on imagery to indicate staging of Soviet combat maneuver divisions, Soviet Air Forces, or air resupply activity. Nevertheless, the existing logistical support facilities appeared adequate to serve a limited-scale intervention operation. Information derived from imagery and collateral sources clearly indicated an enhanced Soviet capability to rapidly achieve limited military intervention.

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REFERENCES

IMAGERY

(TSR) All applicable [redacted] was used in the preparation of this report.

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DOCUMENTS

- 1. All applicable NSA Special Activity Reports for Threat Analysis (SPARTAN) for the period 28 August 1980 to 22 February 1981 (TOP SECRET) [redacted]
- 2. DIA. DDB-1100-130-80-SI, SI-271273/80, Combined Soviet Ground Order of Battle (U), Aug 80 (TOP SECRET) [redacted]
- 3. DIA. DDB-1100-UR-81, Ground Order of Battle: USSR (U), Jan 81 (SECRET) [redacted]
- DIA. DDB-1100-PL-80, Ground Order of Battle: Poland (U), Jul 80 (SECRET) [redacted]
- DIA. DDB-1100-CZ-80, Ground Order of Battle: Czechoslovakia (U), Aug 80 (SECRET) [redacted]
- DIA. DDB-1100-HU-80, Ground Order of Battle: Hungary (U), Jul 80 (SECRET) [redacted]

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(S) Comments and queries regarding this report are welcome. They may be directed to [redacted] Warsaw Pact Forces Division, Imagery Exploitation Group, NPIC, [redacted]

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